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We empirically examine the impact of bank consolidation on bankers’ acquisition of soft 
information about borrowers.  Using a dataset of small businesses, we found that bank mergers 
have a negative impact on soft information acquisition by small banks while those by large banks 
that have less interest in acquiring soft information irrespective of mergers have no impact.  
Detailed analyses of the post-merger organizational restructuring show that the measures of an 
increase in organizational complexity have a negative and significant impact on soft information 
acquisition by small banks, while the measures of cost-cut do not have any significant impact on 
soft information acquisition.  This result implies that the increase in organizational complexity by 
bank mergers hindered soft information acquisition, which is consistent with Stein’s prediction 
[2002, J. Fin.] on the comparative advantage of simple and flat organizations in acquiring and 
processing soft information.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
A surge in bank consolidation has been observed worldwide since the late 1980s and 1990s.  In 
response to this trend, a large volume of empirical literature on the effects of bank consolidation has 
been developed to investigate its economic impact.
1  In  several  studies,  researchers have examined 
the impact of bank consolidation on bank performance or its market value.
2  In other studies, 
researchers have examined the impact of bank consolidation on deposit/credit market performance.
3   
In accordance with the development of the literature on bank-borrower relationships, recent 
studies have shifted their focus to the impact of bank consolidation on the credit availability or 
performance of relationship borrowers, who are typically small businesses.  Since bank 
consolidation usually accompanies the reevaluation of existing borrowers, it is likely to have a 
detrimental effect on the bank-borrower relationships and would, thus, be harmful to borrowers.  
In fact, numerous empirical studies have obtained evidence that is supportive of this view.
4  
However, the existing evidence is indirect in the sense that these studies do not investigate the 
consolidation impact on the key factor that makes the bank-borrower relationship meaningful, soft 
information.  Soft information is defined as information that is difficult to communicate in a 
                                                        
1 Amel, Barnes, Panetta, and Salleo [2004] and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan [1999] provide concise literature 
reviews on this subject.     
2  The literature along this line includes Cornnet, McNutt, and Tehranian [2004], Hosono, Sakai, and Tsuru [2006], 
Houston, James, and Ryngaert [2001], Humphrey and Vale [2004], Kane [2000], Knapp, Gart, and Becher [2005], 
Penas and Unall [2004], Rhodes [1998], Rime and Stiroh [2003], Stiroh [2000], Stiroh and Rumble [2006], and 
Yamori, Harimaya, and Kondo [2003].   
3 As for deposit interest rates, it is found that they temporarily go down after bank mergers (Prager and Hannan 
[1998]) but eventually go up as efficiency gains materialize in the long-run (Focarelli and Panetta [2003]). 
Regarding loan interest rates, it is observed that loan rates increase in a market segment in which competition is 
stifled by a merger (Calomiris and Pomrojnangkool [2005]), while they go down as a result of improved cost 
efficiency if the market shares of merging banks are not too large (Sapienza [2002]).   
4 Studies using U.S. data found that bank consolidation can decrease small business lending by merging banks, 
but that rivals eventually compensate for it (Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell [1998], Peek and Rosengren 
[1998]).    Studies using Italian data also found that bank-firm relationships are more likely to be terminated when 
the lending bank is acquired (Focarelli, Panetta, and Salleo [2002], Sapienza [2002]), but this adverse effect is 
compensated by other banks in the long run (Bonaccorsi-di-Patti and Gobbi [2007]). Some studies also found that 
in-market mergers decrease the market values of the borrowers of acquired banks (Carow, Kane, and Narayanan 
[2006], Karceski, Ongena, and Smith [2005]).   4
verifiable manner even within an organization, such as an entrepreneur’s competence and employee 
morale (Boot [2000], Stein [2002]), and is considered to be accessible exclusively from a primary 
incumbent lender.
5   
In the present study, we try to provide direct evidence for the impact of bank consolidation 
on this key factor, the production or acquisition of soft information by banks.  We propose the 
three hypotheses shown below about the bank-consolidation impact on the production of soft 
information suggested by the existing theories and statistically investigate the relative importance of 
these hypotheses. 
First, an increase in the bank size and organizational complexity due to consolidation may 
deter soft information acquisition.  Stein [2002] shows that information-collecting sections of 
banks, such as bank branches, have smaller incentive to collect soft information when the decision 
authority is alienated from them.  This is because soft information is hardly used when making 
decisions, and, thus, it is rarely rewarded in such an organization.    Although Stein’s original theory 
[2002] does not include the impact of consolidation, we can naturally extend the theory to predict 
that bank consolidation that increases the size of an organization and widens the discrepancy 
between loan-decision sections and information-production sections is likely to hinder soft 
information production.    The difference in the corporate culture among pre-merger banks may also 
prevent the communication of soft information.  Hereafter, we call this detrimental effect of bank 
consolidation the bank-complexity hypothesis. 
Second, bank consolidation entails large-scale restructuring to realize the synergy effect 
mainly resulting from improved cost efficiency, as found in the existing empirical literature.  The 
restructuring includes shutdowns of duplicated branches and administrative sections.  In the 
process of such personnel reductions and relocations, soft information production capacity may be 
diminished.  This hypothesis, which we call the cost-cut hypothesis, predicts that bank mergers 
                                                        
5  By investing to acquire soft information about existing borrowers, a relationship lender can make a profit from 
informational advantage over rival banks in the future, while borrowers can ensure credit availability for their 
promising projects (Sharpe [1990]).   5
decrease soft information acquisition by banks.   
Third, a decrease in the intensity of the lending competition due to consolidation may 
increase soft information acquisition.    As Hauswald and Marquez [2006] demonstrated, the return 
from the investment for information acquisition is more likely to be recouped in the future in less 
competitive lending markets.    This theory predicts that bank consolidation that is likely to decrease 
competitive pressure in a lending market promotes soft information acquisition by banks.    We call 
this the competition hypothesis.  
A unique micro dataset collected from the Management Survey of Corporate Finance 
Issues in the Kansai area of Japan sets the stage for our empirical investigation of the consolidation 
impact on the production of soft information.  The survey, which was conducted right after the 
bank consolidation wave in Japan since the late 1990s in response to the banking crisis, asked firms 
to evaluate to what extent their main banks knew about the responding firms, their owners or 
managers, industries that they belonged to, communities where they were located, and the markets 
of their products/services.  We use these evaluations to measure soft information acquisition by 
main banks.  The survey also provides information about the identification of the main bank of 
each responding firm, its financial standing, and the bank-firm relationship.  Matching this 
information with the bank consolidation data makes it possible to test the impact of bank 
consolidation on soft information acquisition by banks. 
Our statistical analyses show that bank mergers decrease soft information acquisition.  
This result is consistent with the bank-complexity hypothesis and/or the cost-cut hypothesis 
explained above.    The analyses also show that this negative merger impact is observed only among 
small banks but is not observed among large banks, which are less intended to acquire soft 
information regardless of mergers.  This implies that bank mergers hinder soft information 
production by small banks, whereas no deterioration of soft information is observed for large banks.   
The result for small banks is consistent with both the bank-complexity hypothesis and the cost-cut   6
hypothesis explained above, while the result for large banks implies that large banks may not 
acquire soft information. 
The additional analysis on the characteristics of merging banks shows that the post-merger 
increment of the organizational complexity and the post-merger cost-cut do not significantly differ 
by bank size.  However, it shows that the post-merger complexity increment has a negative and 
significant impact on soft information acquisition, in particular, that by small firms, while the 
post-merger cost cut does not have any significant impact.  Thus, our empirical result shows that 
the bank-complexity hypothesis is the primary factor that explains the negative impact of mergers. 
In summary, we obtained results that are consistently supportive of Stein’s theory [2002] or 
its extension.  For small banks, bank mergers have a negative impact through the mechanism of 
the bank-complexity hypothesis, which implies that mergers complicate the managerial organization 
and reduce incentives to produce soft information.  For large banks, no consolidation impact is 
observed, which implies that soft information is not likely to be produced in these banks.  In 
addition to these findings related to bank consolidation, we also obtained evidence that directly 
supports Stein’s theory [2002]:  irrespective of whether or not bank consolidation takes place, 
small banks tend to acquire soft information more often than large banks do.  Thus, our findings 
support Stein’s theory [2002] on the comparative advantage of simple and flat organization in 
producing and processing soft information from three angles. 
Consolidation decisions by banks are an exogenous variable in the context of soft 
information acquisition since it is hardly plausible that the primary purpose of bank consolidation is 
to reduce soft information production.  Therefore, bank consolidation serves as a natural 
experiment to test the effect of the change in organizational complexity or cost reduction on soft 
information acquisition.  In this sense, the present study provides robust evidence for Stein’s 
organizational theory [2002] and reinforces the evidence found by Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, 
and Stein [2005] using U.S. data and that found by Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe [2006] using   7
Japanese data.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II is a summary of the existing 
theories that can predict the effect of bank consolidation on the acquisition of soft information.  
Section III is an introduction of our dataset and our measures of soft information acquisition.  
Section IV is the result of univariate analysis.  The methodology of our multivariate analysis is 
explained, and the main results are presented in Section  V.  Section  VI  is  a  detailed analysis of the 
bank-complexity hypothesis and the cost-cut hypothesis.  The final section is a summary and 
conclusion of the findings.   
 
II.  Background Theory 
 
In small business lending, loan underwriting decisions by banks are often made on the basis of 
qualitative information of borrowers, such as entrepreneurs’ competence and enthusiasm or 
employee morale and skills.
6  This type of information, called soft information, is difficult to 
communicate precisely in a verifiable manner.    We can present a few determinants of the intensity 
of bankers’ soft information acquisition in the context of small business lending.  In this section, 
we review these theories in detail and extend them to predict possible impacts that bank 
consolidation would have on soft information acquisition.     
 
A. The bank-complexity hypothesis 
Stein [2002] has shown that an organization in which the decision-making authority is 
allocated to a lower level in the hierarchy tends to acquire more soft information.    Soft information 
is usually collected at a lower level of the hierarchy, such as loan officers at bank branches.    If the 
authority of loan-underwriting decisions is allocated to an upper level, it is hard for soft information 
                                                        
6  See, for example, Berger and Udell [2002, 2006].   8
to reflect on decision-making, and the effort to acquire such information is not rewarded.
7  
Consequently, soft information acquisition becomes less intensive in an organization in which those 
who acquire soft information do not have a decision-making authority
8.   
Needless to say, bank consolidation increases bank size and complicates the 
decision-making process within the organization.  Furthermore, merged banks have diverse 
historical backgrounds; thus, communication across different corporate cultures becomes harder 
within the new organization.  This may also discourage soft information accumulation by a loan 
officer at a branch level.  Therefore, we can extend Stein’s theory [2002] to predict that bank 
consolidation decreases soft information acquisition by banks.  We call this the bank-complexity 
hypothesis. 
 
B. The cost-cut hypothesis 
An important purpose of bank consolidation is to realize a synergy effect.    Financing costs 
for merged banks may decrease as a result of getting a too-big-to-fail status (Penas and Unal 
[2004]) or acquiring the ability to construct more diversified portfolios.  Operation costs also 
decrease by trimming off duplicated branch networks and other administrative costs.  In order to 
realize such cost efficiency, especially with respect to operation costs, merged banks need to cut 
down on personnel expenses and relocate personnel at the time of consolidation.  Such  a  personnel 
cut or relocation can reduce the production capacity for soft information.  If a merged bank 
considers the accumulation of soft information as a valuable asset that can yield future profits 
exceeding the cost efficiency resulting from a personnel cut, then the bank would try to preserve the 
information production capacity by limiting the personnel cut.    Otherwise, the bank would discard 
parts of the production capacity for soft information at the time of consolidation.   We refer to this 
                                                        
7  Liberti and Mian [2006] empirically show that loan underwriting decisions made at the upper level of the bank 
hierarchy tend to depend less on soft information than those made at a lower level.     
8  Consistent with this prediction, studies such as those by Cole et al. [2004], Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and 
Stein [2005], and Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe [2006] give evidence that banks with a more complex organization 
tend to have weaker relationships with their borrowers than banks with a smaller and simpler organization.   9
deterioration of soft information as the cost-cut hypothesis. 
 
C. The competition hypothesis 
Some theoretical studies have been focused on the effect of increased lending competition 
on soft information acquisition by banks.    Hauswald and Marquez [2006] show that the investment 
in information acquisition decreases as the number of competing banks increases in a framework of 
localized oligopoly.  An additional market share that can be captured by information advantage 
becomes smaller as the number of rivals increases.  Therefore, the investment in information 
acquisition is less likely to be recouped.  This results in the decrease in the investment in soft 
information acquisition.  Boot and Thakor [2000] also show that bankers’ investments in 
relationship lending (sector specialization), which can be interpreted as an investment in the 
acquisition of soft information, decrease with the number of competing banks.
9    Bank 
consolidation decreases the number of competitors.  It should, therefore, have a favorable impact 
on the investment in soft information acquisition.    We call this the competition hypothesis. 
 
In short, the bank-complexity hypothesis and the cost-cut hypothesis predict that a bank 
consolidation decreases soft information acquisition, while the competition hypothesis predicts the 
opposite.  As a first step, we now examine the overall direction of the bank consolidation impact 
on soft information acquisition by banks.   
 
III.  Data 
 
Most of our dataset is collected from the micro data of the Management Survey of Corporate 
                                                        
9 Boot and Thakor [2000] also show (in their Theorem 3) that banks are more likely to provide relationship 
lending for a larger portion of borrowers as the number of rivals increases, given a certain level of upfront 
investment in sector specialization, in order to shield their existing customers from poachers.  We do not focus 
on this effect in this paper, since our dataset captures how much soft information banks maintain as a result of 
upfront investment, rather than how intensively they utilize it.     10
Finance Issues in the Kansai Area of Japan, which was conducted by the Regional Finance 
Workshop at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI) in June 2005.  The 
survey asks small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in three prefectures in the Kansai area, 
Osaka, Hyogo, and Kyoto, about firm characteristics, including financial standing, management 
strategies, bank relationships, and loan transactions.
10   
Target firms from each prefecture are randomly chosen by employee-size categories ((1) 
1-20 employees, (2) 21-50 employees, (3) 51-100 employees, (4) more than 100 employees).    The 
target size from each prefecture is adjusted according to the relative number of enterprises in each 
prefecture; i.e., 5,000 firms from Osaka Prefecture, 2,500 firms from Hyogo Prefecture, and 1,500 
firms from Kyoto Prefecture are selected as target firms.   
A total of 2,020 of 9,000 target firms responded effectively.    The response rate was 22.4%.   
The number of observations was reduced to 1,405 after dropping those firms whose main banks are 
not private banks and those for which no soft information indicators were available, which is 
explained below.  Further, the number of observations was reduced to 992 after dropping the 
observations whose dependent or independent variables were not available.  The industry 
composition in this final dataset is manufacturing (38.1%), information and communications (3.3%), 
transportation (6.4%), wholesale (20.1%), retail (5.8%), real estate (1.7%), restaurants and hotels 
(1.3%), and other services (10.8%).         
 
A.  Measure of soft information 
The survey contains a question that enables us to obtain information about the information 
production by banks.    Each respondent company is asked to evaluate the knowledge or satisfaction 
level of its main bank in terms of various factors, and six of them are related to soft information: 
                                                        
10 The Kansai area is the second largest metropolitan area in Japan and the business center of Western Japan.  
The area consists of six prefectures.    Among these, the target firms were chosen from Osaka, Hyogo, and Kyoto, 
including those located in three major cities, Osaka, Kobe, and Kyoto, in their respective prefectures.  Osaka is 
the second largest city in Japan.   11
knowledge about (Q1) the responding company itself, (Q2) owners or managers of the company, 
(Q3) the industry that the company belongs to, (Q4) the local community where the company is 
located, (Q5) the market for the products/services of the company; and satisfaction with (Q6) the 
frequency of contacts by loan officers of a main bank.  For each of these items, responding 
companies grade their main banks from grade 1 (inadequate or low) to 5 (excellent or high).  We 
use the resulting indicators as the measures of soft information acquisition by main banks.     
In addition to using these indicators separately, we also use the variable SOFTINFO, which 
is defined by the primary principal component of the six soft-information indicators.
11  The 
principal component is calculated from 1,405 observations whose indicators are all available.   We 
consider that SOFTINFO represents sufficient information that is contained in the six indicators, 
since it captures 57.8% of the variance-covariance of the six indicators.   
A shortcoming of these variables is that the responding firms may not necessarily think 
only of soft information when they answer the questions.  For example, an established and 
publicly well-known firm that submits solid financial statements to its main bank may give the bank 
a rating of 5 (excellent) with respect to the banks’ knowledge about the responding company itself 
(Q1) not because the main bank accumulates soft information about the borrower but because a 
significant amount of hard information is available for the firm.  In order to treat this potential 
problem, we will control the availability of hard information for main banks in the regression 
analysis below. 
  
B.  Bank consolidation 
We focus on five types of lending institutions in Japan that constitute the majority of main banks in 
                                                        
11 SOFTINFO is similar to the soft information indices in Scott [2004] and Uchida, Udell, and Yamori [2006].  
However, their indices are constructed from “5 (excellent)” answers only.  Our SOFTINFO makes use of “1” 
through “4” information as well.  In addition, their indices utilize information about the respondent firms’ view 
on the extent that their main banks should know about the firms with respect to the relevant items.  Our 
SOFTINFO does not utilize this information, and, in this sense, it is more focused on the actual knowledge of the 
main banks.       12
our data set: city banks (banks operating nationwide), long-term credit banks (banks specializing in 
long-term finance), trust banks (banks that are legally allowed to operate trust services), regional 
banks (local banks operating within or around one prefecture), and Shinkin banks (cooperative 
institutions that are allowed to lend to member firms only).
12      City banks, long-term credit banks, 
and trust banks are the largest, operate nationwide, and provide a wide variety of services.  
Regional banks are smaller and usually specialize in commercial banking in specific regions.  
Shinkin banks are local community banks and the smallest in our sample.
13   
In response to the serious financial distress since the late 1990s in Japan, a lot of financial 
institutions experienced consolidation.  Among these events, we focus on bank mergers and the 
establishments of bank holding companies.
14  We set the window period from April 2001 to June 
2005.  This is because the RIETI Survey was conducted in June 2005, and it is well-known that 
the effects of bank consolidation vanish after approximately three years (see, for example, Rhodes 
[1998]).  During this period, the Japanese banking industry experienced a surge of bank 
consolidation. There were 12 incidences of the establishment of a bank holding company, 63 events 
of bank mergers, and 3 cases in which banks became subsidiaries of other banks.  Among the 63 
merger events, 5 were among city and long-term credit banks, 4 were among trust banks, 5 were 
among regional banks, and 49 were among Shinkin banks. 
  Focusing on the main banks of our sample firms, we observed 14 mergers (5 among city 
banks, 3 among trust banks, 2 among regional banks, and 4 among Shinkin banks) and 4 bank 
failures (1 regional bank and 3 Shinkin banks) from April 2001 to June 2005.  In our 992 sample 
firms, 595 firms’ main banks experienced a merger in this period.  From this information, we 
define a dummy variable, Merger, which is equal to one if a firm’s main bank experienced a merger 
                                                        
12  Member firms of Shinkin banks have 300 or fewer employees or capital of 900 million yen or less. 
13  The average total asset of each institution type in our dataset as of March 2005 is 48,059 billion JPY for major 
banks (city, long-term credit, and trust banks), 2,716 billion JPY for regional banks, and 918 billion JPY for 
Shinkin banks.   
14 As explained below, a variable representing banks’ asset acquisitions from a liquidated bank is also available.  
Due to the small number of observations, however, detailed analysis on this variable is impossible, and the 
variable is generally insignificant in the regression analysis below.     13
during the period from April 2001 to June 2005, and, otherwise, zero.   
As for the establishment of a bank holding company (BHC) in this period, 8 banks among 
the main banks in our dataset were involved in the foundation of bank holding companies, and 2 
banks became subsidiaries of other banks.  In order to capture the effect of these changes in 
ownership structure, we define a dummy variable, BHC, which is equal to 1 if the firm’s main bank 
established a bank holding company or became a subsidiary of another bank and, otherwise, zero.  
There are several banks that experienced both a merger and the establishment of a bank holding 
company.  In this case, the dummy variable BHC is set to be equal to zero in order to isolate the 
merger effects from the effect of BHC establishments.   
  
IV.  Univariate Analysis 
 
Before running regressions, we conducted a univariate analysis of our soft information 
measures.  Table 1 is a comparison of the distribution of the responses to each of the survey 
questions regarding the soft information acquisition by main banks based on whether or not a main 
bank experienced a merger (Panel A) and whether or not a main bank established a bank holding 
company (Panel B).  Pearson’s χ 
2 statistics about the independence between row items and 
column items are also shown.  In Panel A, it is shown that the companies whose main banks 
experienced mergers tend to give lower grades to their main banks’ knowledge about the companies.   
The Chi-squared tests significantly reject the independence between the merger experience and the 
1-5 answers in all questions but Q3.  Therefore, we can expect that bank mergers will deter soft 
information acquisition by mergeｄ  banks, which is consistent with the bank-complexity hypothesis 
and/or the cost-cut hypothesis.  In contrast, significant correlations are shown in Panel B between 
column items and row items only in Q4 and Q5.    At this point, the effect of BHC establishment on 
soft information seems weaker than that of mergers.     14
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 of our soft information measures that are sorted 
by whether or not the main bank experienced a merger (Panel A) and whether or not the main bank 
experienced the establishment of a bank holding company (Panel B).    The points observed in Table 
1 are verified in this table as well.  Statistically significant differences in the mean responses to 
most questions are shown in Panel A, while such differences are not seen in Panel B.    Furthermore, 
the mean of SOFTINFO is significantly lower for the firms whose main banks experienced mergers, 
whereas the difference is insignificant for those in which main banks founded BHCs.   
  Figure 1 depicts the histogram of SOFTINFO, sorted by Merge (Panel A) and BHC 
(Panel B).  The figures suggest that SOFTINFO tends to be somewhat lower for those companies 
in which the main bank experienced mergers.  However, the difference in the distribution of 
SOFTINFO by whether the main bank established a BHC is less apparent.   
Finally, we examine the difference of SOFTINFO by bank size.  Table 3 shows the mean 
levels of SOFTINFO by splitting the sample firms by bank size and merger experiences.  In the 
table, city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks are classified as large banks, while 
regional banks and Shinkin banks are classified as small banks.  First, when we simply split the 
sample by the size of the main banks, we find that large banks are less inclined to acquire soft 
information (first row).  This is consistent with the original prediction by Stein [2002].  Second, 
mergers decrease SOFTINFO of small main banks significantly (third low), while they do not affect 
SOFTINFO of large main banks at all (second row).    There seems to be a difference in the merger 
impact across bank types.    We elaborate on this relative impact in a later section. 
In summary, the univariate analyses show that bank consolidation, especially mergers by 
small banks, is likely to hinder soft information acquisition.  This result is consistent with the 
bank-complexity hypothesis and/or the cost-cut hypothesis.  In the next section, we will examine 
whether these findings are robust even after controlling for potential covariates.     
   15
 
V.  Multivariate Analysis 
 
A.  Methodology 
In order to examine the impact of bank consolidation on soft information acquisition after 
controlling for other potential factors that could also influence soft information acquisition, we run 
the following linear regression:   
 
SOFTINFOi = β0 + β1*Mergeri + β2*BHCi + β3*control variablesi + εi,     (1) 
 
where i is the index of responding companies.    The definition of the control variables is presented 
in Table 4 together with their descriptive statistics. We are mostly interested in the sign and the 
significance of the coefficient β1.  If this coefficient is negative and significant, then we can 
interpret that the bank-complexity hypothesis and/or the cost-cut hypothesis is stronger.  If it is 
positive and significant, then we can interpret that the competition hypothesis is stronger. 
A potential shortcoming of this dataset is that, since the information is limited to that about 
the current main bank, we cannot determine whether a firm switched main banks upon merger, 
although several empirical studies have shown that there are positive impacts of mergers on the 
probability to switch main banks (Bonaccorsi and Gobbi [2007], Focarelli, Panetta, and Salleo 
[2002], and Sapienza [2002]).    In order to overcome this shortcoming, we include the length of the 
relationship with the main bank into explanatory variables to control for such main-bank switching.   
If the length of the relationship is short, the implication is that the firm switched main banks 
recently, possibly due to a main-bank merger.  Relationship terminations as an ultimate negative 
impact should be captured in the coefficient of the length of relationship, although we cannot single 
out the impact since a relationship may terminate due to reasons other than mergers.  By   16
controlling the effect of such switches, the coefficient β1 captures a merger impact on the soft 
information with respect to firms that kept lending relationships with their main banks in spite of 
merging.  In this sense, β1 represents the most conservative estimate of the merger impact on soft 
information  acquisition.     
In addition to this baseline specification, we adopt two other specifications.   First, to 
accommodate the possibility that the effects of bank consolidation differ according to the type of 
main bank, we use another specification that includes the interaction terms between consolidation 
dummies (Merger and BHC) and bank-type dummies (Regional bank and Shinkin bank).  This is 
to capture the difference in the merger impact by bank type.  Second, we also regress each of the 
six soft-information indicators on the explanatory variables by ordered logit to determine the 
component that is the most seriously affected by the consolidation events.   
As for the control variables, a few variables are worth mentioning.  First, the dummy 
variables of the Regional bank and Shinkin bank by themselves are used as proxies for bank size or 
organizational complexity, which is expected to have positive coefficients according to the original 
prediction by Stein [2002] that small banks are more likely to acquire soft information.    Second, as 
reported in the previous section, the knowledge of the main bank about the borrowing firm may 
include hard information, such as monthly financial reporting. The variables, Audited, Financial 
statement, Financial reporting frequency, and Assets of a firm are used to capture such portion of 
knowledge.  
 
B.  Main  results 
The estimated coefficients are listed in Table 5.  Specification (1) is the baseline 
regression.    Specification (2) uses the asset size of banks instead of the bank-type dummies as the 
proxy for bank size or complexity.  Specification (3) includes the interaction terms of the 
consolidation dummies and the bank-type dummies.   17
In Specifications (1) and (2), both the Merger and BHC dummies have negative 
coefficients.  The coefficients are statistically significant for the Merger dummy, while the BHC 
dummy is statistically less significant.  The result is consistent with the univariate one in Table 2 
and supports the bank-complexity hypothesis and/or the cost-cut hypothesis, which predict that 
bank mergers decrease soft information acquisition. 
However, the results of Specification (3) show that the type of bank matters.  A negative 
effect of the bank merger on soft information is observed only when the main bank is a regional or a 
Shinkin bank.    This is consistent with the results in Table 3.    In other words, bank mergers have a 
negative impact on soft information acquisition only for small banks, and no deterioration of 
information is observed from the mergers of large banks.  The BHC dummy is not statistically 
significant. 
Table 6 is a summary of the estimated coefficients of the Merger and BHC dummies when 
the response of each question (Q1-Q6) is regressed on these dummies and other covariates by 
ordered logit.  In Specifications (1) and (2) (Panels A and B), the coefficients of the Merger 
dummy are negative in all regressions and statistically significant with respect to four questions.   
The signs of the coefficients of the BHC dummy are generally negative although the coefficients are 
insignificant except for Q4 and Q5.  In Specification (3) (Panel C), the coefficients of the 
interaction terms of the Merger dummy and the small bank dummies, Regional and Shinkin, have 
negative and significant coefficients.    The interactions of the BHC dummy do not have statistically 
significant coefficients, although they have negative coefficients.  The results of Specification (3) 
in this table are, therefore, consistent with those in Table 5.
15 
The presence of a merger impact against small banks, as opposed to its absence against 
large banks, is quite suggestive about the mechanism generating the negative impact of mergers on 
soft information acquisition.    Another important and noteworthy result is that small banks seem to 
                                                        
15 As mentioned above, if we change the BHC dummy to include banks that have undergone a merger and the 
establishment of a bank holding company, the effect of the merger dummy becomes less significant.   18
accumulate soft information, while large banks do not, irrespective of mergers (the first row in 
Table 3, or the coefficient of the Shinkin dummy in Table 5), which is consistent with the prediction 
of the original theory of Stein [2002].
16  Taken together, these findings suggest that it is highly 
likely that the increase in the complexity upon merger negatively affects the acquisition of soft 
information by small banks, as predicted by the bank-complexity hypothesis.   
However, it is also possible that the difference of merger impacts just stems from the 
difference in the magnitude of an increase in organizational complexity and/or of the cost  cut 
across bank types.  For example, if a cost reduction that accompanies a merger is less severe for 
large banks than for small banks, the negative impact against small banks and lack of impact against 
large banks are nothing but the consequence of the cost-cut hypothesis.    It is, therefore, interesting 
to examine what brings about the difference in the merger impact by bank type in detail.  We 
investigate this issue in the next section using additional data about the characteristics of merged 
banks. 
The result of the weaker effect of the BHC establishment as opposed to the negative and 
significant effect of a merger possibly reflects the fact that bank mergers accompany drastic cost 
reduction and often entail the shift of the authority to make lending decisions, while BHC 
establishments rarely entail such drastic reorganizations or cost reduction.  However, we cannot 
deny the possibility that the BHC dummy works as a partial proxy for bank size or bank type since 
most banks that experienced the establishment of BHC are large banks. 
The estimated coefficients of a couple of control variables are worth mentioning.  First, 
the size of the firm measured by a log of assets has positive and significant coefficients.    This may 
well be interpreted as large firms being well-known.  A similar effect can also be seen in the 
coefficients of the financial reporting frequency.  These results imply that a hard-information 
component commingled with our soft information measures is successfully controlled by these 
                                                        
16 However, it is significant at a 10% level, and another small bank dummy, the regional bank dummy, is not 
significant.    The interaction term of the regional bank dummy and the merger dummy is significant and negative.   19
explanatory variables.  Second, the non-performing loan ratio of a main bank has a negative and 
significant coefficient in all the specifications.  This result implies the possibility that the 
accumulation of non-performing loans prevents banks from actively producing soft information 
about borrowers, although we need more careful examination of the causality between bad loans 
and soft information acquisition.   
 
VI.  Bank-complexity hypothesis and cost-cut hypothesis 
 
The analysis in the previous section revealed that a bank merger has a negative impact on 
soft information acquisition.  This result is consistent with both the bank-complexity hypothesis 
and the cost-cut hypothesis.    We also found the presence of a negative merger impact against small 
banks and its absence against large banks.  The difference may be because large banks do not 
acquire soft information, as predicted by Stein [2002], or it may be because the extent of the 
complexity increment in banking organizations and/or the extent of cost reduction differs by bank 
type.    In this section, we investigate the cause of the impact difference by bank size with additional 
information about the organizational complexity and organizational restructuring of main banks.     
 
A.  Univariate  analysis 
We define the measures of the increase in organizational complexity and the measures of 
cost reductions upon mergers.  First, we define the measures of the complexity increase from the 
proxies of organizational complexity: asset size, loan size, number of bankers, and number of 
branches.  For merged banks, we use the average increasing rate of each variable from each 
pre-merger bank to the post-merger bank.  To be more specific, for each variable X (= asset size, 
loan size, number of bankers, or number of branches), we calculate the following measure:   
Complexity measure for Merged banks 
(X of the post-merger bank at the end of year s) / (weighted average     20
  of X of pre-merger banks at the end of year s-1) – 1,  (2) 
 
where s is the year during which the merger took place.      For non-merged banks as the controlling 
group, we use the annual increasing rate of each variable averaged throughout the window period 
from 2001 through 2005: 








(X at the end of year t) / (X at the end of year t-1) – 1 ] .  (3) 
 
Second, to investigate the extent of cost reduction, we focus on the increasing rates of four 
variables: the number of branches, the number of bankers, overhead and personnel expenses, and 
ordinary expenses.    For merged banks, we calculate the three-year increasing rates of each variable 
summed over all the pre-merger banks.  That is, the cost-cut measure of variable X (=number of 
branches, number of bankers, overhead and personnel expenses, and ordinary expenses) is: 
Cost-cut measure for merged banks 
  (X of the post-merger bank at the end of year s+2) / (X summed   
  over all the pre-merger banks at the end of year s-1) – 1.    (4) 
 
This measure represents to what extent total costs are reduced as a whole among banks involved in 
the merger.  We take the three-year period because it is likely to take more than one year to 
complete the cost reduction.  For non-merged banks as the controlling group, we use the annual 
increasing rates of these variables averaged through the window period, but this time they are 
multiplied by three to match the duration of merged banks’ rates: 
Cost-cut measure for non-merged banks 








{(X at the end of year t) / (X at the end of year t-1) – 1} ] = 3 * (2).  (5) 
 
Table 7 is a comparison of the means of the measures for the complexity increment in 
banking organization (Panel A) and for cost reduction (Panel B).  Panels A-1 and B-1 are 
calculated from all banks, panels A-2 and B-2 are calculated from large banks only (Regional = 
Shinkin = 0), and panels A-3 and B-3 are calculated from small banks only (Regional or Shinkin = 
1).    Panels A-4 and B-4 show the statistics for the test of the difference in means.   21
Panel A clearly shows that mergers increased the organizational complexity.  The test 
statistics show that the differences in the means of all the measures for merged banks and 
non-merged banks differ at a 1% level of significance.  This remains the case when banks are 
classified according to type.    The last column shows that the increase in organizational complexity 
upon merger does not differ significantly according to the size of the merging banks.   
Panel B shows that banks that experienced a merger cut down on all the items presented in 
the table by some 20% or more on average within two years after a merger.  In contrast, banks 
without any merger events decrease the items by smaller rates.    The difference in the magnitude of 
the cost cut between merged banks and non-merged banks is significant, although the statistical 
significance is weaker than that of the complexity increment.  If banks are sorted by type, the 
difference becomes more insignificant.    The decrease in the number of bankers is more precipitous 
for merged banks than for non-merged banks, but, as to other cost-cut measures, non-merged banks 
reduce costs as much as merged banks.    The difference between large banks and small banks is not 
significant again (the last column). 
In summary, we conclude that mergers are accompanied by a significant complexity 
increment, whereas cost reduction due to mergers is not very extensive since banks that did not 
experience mergers also reduced costs.  This finding, therefore, implies that the bank-complexity 
hypothesis is more likely to hold than the cost-cut hypothesis. 
As for the difference in the merger impact across bank types, the last column shows that 
there is no difference in the magnitude of the complexity increment or in cost reduction between 
large banks and small banks.  This implies that the finding in section V.B that the impact of a 
merger differs by bank type does not stem from a difference in the extent of the complexity 
increment or the post-merger cost reduction across bank types.  Rather, this supports the 
interpretation along the line of the original theory of Stein [2002] predicting that large banks do not 
normally produce soft information and that, as a result, no deterioration is observed upon merger.   22
 
B.  Multivariate  analysis 
We further investigate the impact of the increment in organizational complexity and cost cut 
by multivariate analysis.    In this analysis, in place of bank consolidation dummies in Specification 
(2) in the previous section, we use each of the complexity measures or the cost-cut measures.  
Table 8 contains excerpts of the major results of this analysis. 
The results show that the complexity measures have a negative impact on SOFTINFO 
(Panel A), while the cost-cut measures have a positive impact (Panel B).  The significance of the 
estimated coefficients is not strong in either specification except that the complexity increment 
measured by the amount of loans has a negative and significant impact on SOFTINFO.  The 
significance levels of the other complexity measures are, at worst, significant at a 20% level, while 
the coefficients of cost-cut measures are by far less significant.  This result provides more 
evidence for the significance of the bank-complexity hypothesis, although the significance of the 
result is weaker. 
Finally, the difference in the impact is examined according to bank type.    Panel C of Table 
8 contains a report of the results.  In Specifications (1) and (2), the complexity measures have 
negatively significant impacts on SOFTINFO when the main bank is a regional bank.  When the 
main bank is a Shinkin bank, the coefficients of the cross terms are insignificant, but the p values 
are small.  The interactions of bank-type dummies and cost-cut measures (not reported) do not 
have any statistically significant coefficients.  Thus, it is more likely that the bank-complexity 
hypothesis is the primary hypothesis that explains the negative impact of mergers on soft 
information acquisition by small banks. 
 
VII.  Summary and Conclusion 
   23
In this paper, we have found that:   
(1) Bank mergers have a negative impact on soft information acquisition by small banks, 
whereas no impact is observed for large banks (Tables 3, 5, and 6). 
(2) The increase in organizational complexity upon merger has a significant impact on 
information acquisition by small banks, while the cost reduction upon merger does not 
(Table 8).   
(3) The magnitudes of the cost reduction and the complexity increments upon merger do not 
vary according to bank size (Table 7). 
(4) When a merger does not take place, small banks are likely to acquire soft information 
more extensively than large banks (Tables 3, 5, and 6). 
Finding (1) is consistent with the bank-complexity hypothesis and/or cost-cut hypothesis for 
small banks.  Finding (2) suggests that the former is the primary mechanism that generates the 
negative impact of mergers against soft information acquisition by small banks.  Finding (3) 
proves that the asymmetric impact by bank size does not come from the difference in the magnitude 
of complexity increments or cost reduction upon merger by bank size.  Rather, as confirmed in 
Finding (4), the asymmetry in the merger impact is likely to come from the lack of the production 
of soft information by large banks in a typical operation, which supports the prediction of the 
original theory of Stein [2002].   
Thus, our findings support the theory by Stein [2002] on the comparative advantage of 
simple and flat organization in producing and processing soft information from three angles.    First, 
small banks acquire more soft information than large banks do in a typical operation.  Second, 
when a merger takes place, it complicates managerial organization and deters the production of soft 
information or the maintenance of that accumulated in small banks (the bank-complexity 
hypothesis).  Third, such an effect is not observed in large banks that accumulate little soft 
information before mergers.     24
  The promotion of bank mergers is a popular policy for improving the stability of the 
banking  sector.  Our  analysis  suggests that there can be a proviso against this prescription, i.e., soft 
information accumulated through existing bank-firm relationships might be deteriorated by bank 
mergers, which could be economically costly for small banks and their borrowers.  However, to 
the best of our knowledge, no thorough analysis of the welfare impact of bank mergers taking into 
account the production of information by banks has ever been conducted.
17  Empirical  studies  that 
integrate both the impact on information production, which we investigated in this paper, and the 
efficiency improvement by synergy effects are required in order to evaluate the overall welfare 
impact of bank consolidation.  More general and extensive empirical/theoretical studies on this 
subject remain to be done. 
                                                        
17 As an exception, Hauswald and Marquez [2006] suggest the possibility that bank mergers improve economic 
efficiency by decreasing duplicated information acquisition costs.   25
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 Table 1    Distribution of responses to the survey questions on soft information   
 
Each cell contains the number of respondent companies concerning the questions asking to what extent their current main banks are satisfied with the bank’s 
knowledge about (Q1) the responding company, (Q2) the owners or managers of the company, (Q3) the industry that the company belongs to, (Q4) the local 
community where the company is located, and (Q5) the major market of the company; and with (Q6) how often a loan officer of the main bank contacts the company.   
In Panel A, the distribution is presented by whether the company’s main bank experienced a merger (Merger=1) or not (Merger=0) during the period from Apr. 2001 
through Jun. 2005, whereas, in Panel B, the distribution is presented by whether the company’s main bank established a bank holding company (BHC=1) or not 
(BHC=0) during the same period.    “Pearson χ
2” and “P-values” are statistics for the hypothesis testing about the independence between row items and column items. 
*, **, and *** indicate that the hypothesis of no-independence is rejected at a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
A. Distribution of grades, sorted by Merger. 
  Reply to each question  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q6 
(5:excellent- 1:inadequate)  Merger=0  Merger=1 Merger=0 Merger=1 Merger=0 Merger=1 Merger=0 Merger=1 Merger=0 Merger=1 Merger=0 Merger=1 
5 124  151 126 138 42 39  66 39 32 23 62 57 
4 209  306 191 286 136 215  117 165 92 183 170 250 
3  50 105 67 131 187 287 185 335 233 313 142 216 
2  11 27 11 29 29 46 26 48 37 62 17 54 
1  3 6 2 11 3 8 3 8 3 14 6 18 
Number  of  observations  992 992 992 992 992 992 
Pearson χ
2 9.01 15.58 5.83 28.82  17.93  17.19 
P-value  0.061 *  0.004 ***  0.212  0.000 ***  0.001 ***  0.002 *** 
 
B. Distribution of grades, sorted by BHC. 
  Reply to each question  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q6 
(5:excellent- 1: inadequate) BHC=0 BHC=1 BHC=0 BHC=1 BHC=0 BHC=1 BHC=0 BHC=1 BHC=0 BHC=1 BHC=0 BHC=1 
5 255  20 242 22 75 6  101 4 50 5 109 10 
4 463  52 436 41 322 29  265 17 260 15 381 39 
3 143  12 175 23 427 47  464 56 485 61 322 36 
2 34  4 38 2 69 6  63 11 92 7 68 3 
1  7   2 1 1292   92 1 52 2 22  
Number  of  observations  992 992 992 992 992 992 
Pearson χ
2 (4) 4.05  3.29  2.17  12.62  7.91  2.55 
P-value  0.399  0.510  0.704  0.013 **  0.095 *  0.637 
 Table 2      Descriptive statistics for soft information variables   
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables representing the acquisition of soft information are shown.  “Response to Q1” through “Response to Q6” are variables 
explained in Table 1 (with a 1-5 value).    SOFTINFO is the first principal component of the principal component analysis over “Response to Q1” through “Response 
to Q6” variables.      In Panel A, the statistics are presented for “Merger=0” firms vs. “Merger=1” firms, whereas, in Panel B, they are presented for “BHC=0” firms vs. 
“BHC=1” firms, where the definitions of “Merger” and “BHC” are the same as in Table 1.      *, **, and *** indicate that the sample mean of each group is different at 
a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-sided test). 
 
A. Descriptive statistics for soft information variables, sorted by Merger 
 
 Merger=0  Merger=1 
Variables  No. of obs. Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max.  No. of obs. Mean 
  S.D. Min.  Max. 
Response to Q1  397 4.108 0.779 1 5  595 3.956 **  0.838 1 5
Response to Q2  397 4.078 0.799 1 5  595 3.859 ***  0.892 1 5
Response to Q3  397 3.466 0.808 1 5  595 3.388   0.778 1 5
Response to Q4  397 3.547 0.871 1 5  595 3.301 ***  0.764 1 5
Response to Q5  397 3.285 0.773 1 5  595 3.234   0.779 1 5
Response to Q6  397 3.668 0.844 1 5  595 3.461 ***  0.897 1 5




B. Descriptive statistics for soft information variables, sorted by BHC 
 
 BHC=0  BHC=1 
Variables  No. of obs. Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max.  No. of obs. Mean 
  S.D. Min.  Max. 
Response to Q1  902 4.025 0.814 1 5  90 3.933
  0.859 1 5
Response to Q2  902 3.953 0.860 1 5  90 3.878
  0.885 1 5
Response to Q3  902 3.427 0.790 1 5  90 3.344
  0.796 1 5
Response to Q4  902 3.428 0.818 1 5  90 3.111 ***  0.756 1 5
Response to Q5  902 3.264 0.781 1 5  90 3.156
  0.733 1 5
Response to Q6  902 3.540 0.888 1 5  90 3.578
  0.821 1 5
SOFTINFO 902 0.130 1.779 -7.462 4.199  90 -0.180
  1.897 -7.462 4.199
 Figure 1      Histogram of SOFTINFO by the merger experience of main banks 
 
Histogram of the variable SOFTINFO (for its definition, see Table 2).    In Panel A, the histograms of the firms in which the 
main bank experienced a merger (“Merge=1”) and did not (“Merge=0”) are compared.  In Panel B, the histograms of the 
firms in which the main bank established a bank holding company (“BHC=1”) and did not (“BHC=0”) are compared. 
 








































 Table  3   Difference  in  SOFTINFO by bank size and merger 
 
P-values for the test about the difference in the means of SOFTINFO among two groups are also shown.  
For the definition of SOFTINFO, see Table 2.  *** indicates the statistical significance at a 1% level in 





(s.d.)  # of obs.
Mean of 
SOFTINFO
(s.d.)  # of obs.
t-test 
 H 0: |(1)-(2)|=0 
p-value 
(1) Large banks  (2) Small banks  
       
-0.059   655  0.413  337  0.000  
(0.068)     (0.100)    *** 
A. Large banks only   
(1) Merged banks (2)  Non-merged  banks  
-0.049   571  -0.124  84  0.715  
(0.074)    (0.186)   
B. Small banks only       
(1) Merged banks  (2) Non-merged banks   
-0.746   24  0.502 313  0.001  
(0.445)        (0.100)     *** 
 Table  4   Descriptive  statistics  of  covariates 
 
 
Variables  No. of Obs. Mean S.D.  Min  Max  Definition 
Regional bank  992  0.203 0.402 0 1  A dummy equal to 1 if the main bank is a regional bank and 0 otherwise. 
Shinkin bank  992  0.137 0.344 0 1  A dummy equal to 1 if the main bank is a Shinkin bank and 0 otherwise. 
Audited 992  0.121 0.326 0 1  A dummy equal to 1 if the firm is audited and 0 otherwise. 
Financial reporting frequency 992  2.604 3.099 1 13  Frequency of submission of the financial statements to the main bank (months). 
Financial statement  992  0.978 0.147 0 1  A dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a financial statement and 0 otherwise. 
Assets   992  20.94 1.507 12.95 26.21  Natural log of assets of the firm. 
Firm profit in the last two yrs. (deficit, surplus)  992  0.098 0.297 0 1 
A dummy equal to 1 if the firm reported deficit two years ago and surplus in the 
previous year and 0 otherwise. 
Firm profit in the last two yrs. (surplus, deficit)  992  0.067 0.249 0 1 
A dummy equal to 1 if the firm reported surplus two years ago and deficit in the 
previous year and 0 otherwise. 
Firm profit in the last two yrs. (deficit, deficit)  992  0.055 0.229 0 1 
A dummy equal to 1 if the firm reported deficit both 2 years ago and in the 
previous year and 0 otherwise. 
Paying dividend  992  0.422 0.494 0 1  A dummy equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. 
Firm age    992  49.98 24.18 1.333 135.7  Firm age (years old). 
Years of relationship with MB  992  27.48 16.08 0 100  Years of the relationship of the firm with its main bank (years). 
Time distance from MB  992  19.23 19.25 5 180  Time distance from the firm to its main bank (minutes: categorical). 
Subsidiary of other companies  992  0.109 0.312 0 1 
A dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a subsidiary of other company and 0 
otherwise. 
Visit by non-MBs increased (0,1)  992  0.611 0.488 0 1 
A dummy equal to 1 if the visits by loan officers of non-main banks increased
and 0 otherwise. 
Number of bank branches  992  43.64 38.73 1 139  Number of bank branches in the city where the firm is located. 
Asset acquisition  992  0.037 0.190 0 1  A dummy equal to 1 if the main bank acquired assets of a liquidated bank 
during the period from April 2001 to June 2005. 
Assets of MB (log)  992  30.67 1.727 26.29 32.14  Natural log of the assets of the main bank. 
Loan/deposit of MB  992  0.695 0.176 0.178 1.390  Loan/deposit ratio of the main bank. 
Capital ratio of MB  992  0.037 0.012 0.022 0.127  Capital ratio of the main bank. 
Non-performing loan ratio of MB  992  0.023 0.011 0.008 0.098 
{(loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy) + (past due loans in arrears by 6 
months or more) + (loans in arrears by 3 months or more and less than 6 
months) + (restructured loans)} / (total loans outstanding) of the main bank. 
 Table 5      Effects of mergers and BHCs on soft information 
 
Dependent variable: SOFTINFO.  OLS with robust standard errors.  The definitions of “Merger” and “BHC” are the same as in 
Table 1.  Other covariates are as shown in Table 3.  Constant terms are omitted from the table.  *, **, and *** indicate that the 
coefficient is different from zero at a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-sided test). 
 
Independent variables  (1)
  (2)
  (3) 
   
Merger (0,1)  -0.893
** -0.862
***   
 (0.392)   (0.284)      
BHC (0,1)  -0.711
* -0.764
**   
 (0.423)   (0.355)      
Merger*major bank (0,1)           -0.455   
           (0.584)   
Merger*regional bank (0,1)           -1.223 
*** 
           (0.466)   
Merger*Shinkin bank (0,1)           -1.469 
** 
           (0.599)   
BHC*major bank (0,1)           -0.415   
           (0.624)   
BHC*regional bank (0,1)           -0.028   
           (0.789)   
Audited  (0,1)  -0.231  -0.235  -0.221   
  (0.169)  (0.170)  (0.167)   




  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)   
Financial statement (0,1)  -0.412   -0.415   -0.466   
  (0.376)  (0.376)  (0.391)   




  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.051)   
Firm profit in the last two yrs.    0.151   0.167   0.136   
(deficit,  surplus) (0.194)  (0.195)  (0.192)   
Firm profit in the last two yrs.    -0.405
** -0.415  -0.433 
** 
(surplus,  deficit) (0.202)  (0.204)  (0.204)   
Firm profit in the last two yrs.    0.215   0.219   0.218   
(deficit,  deficit) (0.255)  (0.254)  (0.255)   




  (0.125)  (0.125)  (0.125)   
Firm age (log)  -0.037   -0.036   -0.031   
  (0.123)  (0.123)  (0.123)   
Years of relationship with MB (log)  0.037   0.033   0.028   
  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074)   




  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.067)   




  (0.208)  (0.208)  (0.208)   
Visit by non-MBs increased (0,1)  0.158   0.156   0.142   
 0.113   0.113   (0.114)   
 (Table 5 continued) 
Number of bank branches (log)  -0.036   -0.038   -0.046   
  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.061)   
Regional bank (0,1)  0.400       0.719   
 (0.421)       (0.622)   
Shinkin bank (0,1)  1.172
*     1.557 
* 
 (0.653)       (0.891)   
Assets of MB (log)       -0.136      
       (0.093)      
Asset acquisition (0,1)  -0.195   -0.064   -0.290   
  (0.284)  (0.274)  (0.288)   
Loan/deposit of MB  1.571
** 0.478  1.416   
  (0.802)  (0.438)  (0.868)   




  (6.242)  (6.506)  (6.316)   




  (7.623)  (7.220)  (8.457)   
Industry Dummies  YES
  YES
  YES 
 
Urban dummies (Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto)  YES
  YES
  YES 
 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.126  0.125  0.127   
Number of observations  992
   992
   992 
   
 
     Table 6      Effects of mergers and BHCs on each component of soft information 
 
Dependent variable: Response to each question (1-5) (see Table 1).    Ordered logit.    The definitions of “Merger” and “BHC” are the 
same as in Table 1.    Other covariates are as shown in Table 3.    *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at a 
significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-sided test). 
 
 
A. Specification (1) (the set of explanatory variables is the same as Specification (1) in Tables 4 and 
5). 
   Q1 
   Q2 
   Q3 
   Q4 
   Q5 
   Q6 
   





  (0.465)   (0.426) (0.477) (0.500) (0.448)   (0.416) 
BHC  (0,1)  -0.217   -0.560 -0.762 -1.359
*** -0.946 
** 0.409 
  (0.482)   (0.419) (0.484) (0.499) (0.470)   (0.413) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.056 
   0.055
   0.054
   0.056
   0.043 
   0.049
   
Number of observations  992 
   992
   992
   992
   992 
   992
   
 
 
B. Specification (2) (the set of explanatory variables is the same as Specification (2) in Tables 4 and 
5). 
   Q1 
   Q2 
   Q3 
   Q4 
   Q5 
   Q6 
   






  (0.338)   (0.318) (0.348) (0.355) (0.331)   (0.325) 




  (0.396)   (0.367) (0.404) (0.416) (0.396)   (0.364) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.054 
   0.055
   0.052
   0.057
   0.043 
   0.047
   
Number of observations  992 
   992
   992
   992
   992 
   992
   
 
 
C. Specification (3) (the set of explanatory variables is the same as Specification (3) in Tables 4 and 
5). 
   Q1 
   Q2 
   Q3 
   Q4 
   Q5 
   Q6 
   
Merger*major  bank  (0,1)  -0.169   -0.021  -1.165  -0.806  -1.290    0.926
* 
  (0.570)   (0.941)  (1.202)  (0.796)  (1.074)   (0.493)  
Merger*regional bank (0,1)  1.088    -0.531   -1.729
*** -3.295
*** -1.496 
*** 0.446  
  (1.600)   (0.901)  (0.625)  (0.660)  (0.476)   (0.529)  
Merger*Shinkin bank (0,1)  -1.299 
** -1.557
*** -0.832  -0.902  -0.923   -1.352
* 
  (0.625)   (0.570)  (0.718)  (0.783)  (0.682)   (0.708)  
BHC*major bank (0,1)  -0.151    0.244  -1.111  -1.312  -1.472    1.234
**
  (0.618)   (0.971)  (1.217)  (0.813)  (1.093)   (0.554)  
BHC*regional bank (0,1)  0.387    -0.295  -0.109  -0.327  -0.132    1.047  
  (0.831)   (0.659)  (0.936)  (0.754)  (0.974)   (0.699)  
Pseudo R-squared  0.058 
   0.057
  0.055
  0.060
  0.045 
   0.052
 
Number of observations  992 
   992
  992
  992
  992 
   992
 Table 7 Complexity increment measures and cost-cut measures 
 
The degrees of the increment in organizational complexity (Panel A) and cost reduction (Panel B) are compared between banks that experienced a merger 
(Merged) and those that did not (Non-merged).   For Merged banks, a complexity measure of X (= Asset, Loan, … ) is calculated as (X of post-merger 
bank at s+1) / (weighted average of X of pre-merger banks at s-1)-1, while a cost-cut measure X is calculated as (X of post-merger bank at s+2) / (sum of 
X of pre-merger banks at s-1) -1, where s is the year a merger took place; for Non-merged banks, each complexity measure is the average annual increase 
in X throughout the window period, and each cost-cut measure is three times the average annual increase.  P-values for the test about the difference in 
the means are also shown.    ***, **, and * mean that the means are statistically different at a 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
[A. Complexity measures] 
[A-1 All banks]  [A-2 Large banks]  [A-3 Small banks] 
(Regional, Shinkin)  [A-4 Difference in means] 











































1.059   10  0.011  43 0.884  5  -0.010  2  1.234   5  0.012  41 0.000   0.072   0.007   0.664   Asset  
(0.843)    (0.033)   (0.782)   (0.062)   (0.955)    (0.032)   *** * ***  
0.979   10  -0.005  43 0.753  5 -0.040  2 1.206  5  -0.003 41 0.000  0.046  0.009  0.537    Loan 
(0.799)    (0.030)   (0.594)   (0.050)   (0.978)    (0.028)   *** ** ***  
1.112   8  -0.032  43 1.010  4 -0.006  2 1.213   4  -0.033  41 0.000  0.018  0.021  0.800   Number of bankers 
(0.757)    (0.037)   (0.506)   (0.011)   (1.026)    (0.038)   *** ** **  
1.033   8  -0.013  43 0.937  4 -0.008  2 1.128  4  -0.013  41 0.000  0.005  0.006  0.740    Number of branches
(0.563)    (0.035) (0.320) (0.013) (0.783)    (0.036) *** *** ***    
[B. Cost-cut measures] 
[B-1 All banks]  [B-2 Large banks]  [B-3 Small banks] 
(Regional, Shinkin)  [B-4 Difference in means] 











































-0.260   6  -0.096  43 -0.270  4  -0.017  2  -0.240   2  -0.100  41 0.004   0.031   0.043   0.784   Number of bankers 
(0.090)    (0.112)   (0.107)   (0.034)   (0.069)    (0.113)   *** ** **  
-0.178   6  -0.039  43 -0.178  4 -0.025  2 -0.178   2  -0.040  41 0.023  0.101  0.348  1.000   Number of branches
(0.106)    (0.105)   (0.088)   (0.040)   (0.183)    (0.107)   **       
-0.180   7  -0.056  43 -0.180  5 0.038  2 -0.181   2  -0.060  41 0.074  0.117  0.353  0.994   Overhead & 
personnel expenses  (0.144)    (0.090)   (0.157)   (0.064)   (0.162)    (0.089)   *       
-0.435   7  -0.134  43 -0.488  5 -0.339  2 -0.305   2  -0.124  41 0.039 0.633  0.536  0.640   Ordinary expenses 
(0.273)    (0.253)   (0.262)   (0.246)   (0.355)    (0.252)   **        Table 8  Impacts of the complexity increment and cost-cut on SOFTINFO 
 
OLS with robust standard errors.  ***, **, and * mean that the respective means are statistically different 
at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.  The  independent  variables shown below are the 




A. Complexity increment measures only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Asset   -0.189 
       
 
 (0.119)
       
 
Loan 
  -0.232 




     
 
Number of bankers 
    -0.245 
   
 
 
    (0.179)
   
 
Number of branches
      -0.287  
 
 
      (0.205) 
 
Adjusted R
2 0.119  0.119  0.143  0.143    
Number of observations  986 986 731 731   
 
 
B. Cost-cut measures only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Number of bankers  0.589     
 (0.608)    
Number of branches 0.099    
  (0.821)   
Overhead & personnel expenses  0.431    
  (0.470)   
Ordinary expenses  0.247    
  (0.259)  
Adjusted R
2 0.146  0.145  0.121  0.121    
Number of observations  718 718 968 968   
 
  
C. Impact of the complexity increment by bank type 
 (1)   (2)   (3) (4)   
Asset   0.098 
      
 (0.150)
    
Asset * Regional bank dummy  -1.244 
**    
   (0.504)
    
Asset * Shinkin bank dummy  -0.547 
    
 (0.386)
    
Loan  0.076    
  (0.127)
    
Loan * Regional bank dummy  -1.292 
**    
  (0.552)
    
Loan * Shinkin bank dummy  -0.566 
    
  (0.387)
    
Number of bankers  0.039    
  (0.207)   
Number of bankers  -2.168    
   *  Regional  bank  dummy  (3.991)   
Number of bankers  -0.528    
   *  Shinkin  bank  dummy  (0.413)   
Number of branches 0.045  
 
  (0.233) 
 
Number of branches -1.568  
 
   *  Regional  bank  dummy  (3.133) 
 
Number of branches -0.621  
 
   *  Shinkin  bank  dummy      (0.484) 
   
Adjusted R
2 0.125  0.125  0.188  0.188    
Number of observations  986 986 731 731   
 